INTRODUCTION
In this article I use settlement, mortuary, and architectural data to examine the development of political inequality in Mesoamerica. Many archaeologists have identified the emergence of self-perpetuating hierarchical human relations as one of the most fundamental evolutionary changes to have occurred in human history (Earle 1991a; Price and Feinman 1995; Arnold 1996) . The evolutionary processes involved in the development of political inequality and rank society (Fried 1967) are explored in this article by comparing two regional archaeological sequences in Formative Mesoamerica: that of the Soconusco and the Valley of Oaxaca (Figs. 1 and 2 and Table 1 ).
The past 50 years of evolutionary analysis have demonstrated that archaeologists, with their diachronic data, are in an advantageous position to document evolutionary processes over long expanses of time (Drennan 1991a ; Rambo 1991; Spencer 1997) . In fact, since the 1970s, many cultural anthropologists have abandoned evolutionary theory for structural and symbolic paradigms (see Ortner 1984) . The abandonment of an evolutionary paradigm by many cultural anthropologists may be due, at least in part, to the inappropriateness of the temporal scale of their data for exploring long-term patterns of change. Ethnographic observation usually encompasses a few years, occasionally a decade, and, with the help of ethnohistoric documents, a century or two. Such a limited temporal scale contrasts with archaeological data that accesses patterns brought into focus by millennia of human history.
Archaeological data also document forms of cultural organization and evolutionary processes that have not persisted into the 20th century. Archaeologically documented phenomena such as emergent complexity (Arnold 1996) tion (e.g., Flannery 1972: 404; Plog 1974: 5-11) .
Recent evolutionary studies have demonstrated that indices of complexity can change at different rates (McGuire 1983; O'Shea and Barker 1996) , and societies can "skip" levels of complexity (Yoffee 1993; Liu 1996) or cycle between them ( Anderson 1994 Anderson , 1996 . The basic premise of such studies is that cultures change over time and that such change may exhibit regularities when multiple trajectories are compared. Such is the case when cultures are historically related (e.g., Blanton et al. 1993; Drennan 1996) and also when they are not (e.g., Trigger 1993; Earle 1997) . Asserting that there are developmental regularities is not a polemic stance but a hypothesis which requires documentation. The most fundamental issue faced by anthropological archaeologists interested in cultural evolution is to determine the best way to document societies when and if they change and to explore the possible regularity of such changes in order to identify evolutionary processes. If cultures do not evolve in a directional manner, as critics have stated, then how do they evolve? What are some of the underlying processes that explain such change? I begin this article by discussing the concepts of factional competition and peer polity interaction. Then, I evaluate a number of models that characterize society in terms of the manner in which social integration is maintained (Leach 1954; Blanton et al. 1996; Blanton 1998) and, by extension, the strategies that elite factions within a given society employ to consolidate power in rank societies (Flannery 1968; Renfrew 1974; Spencer 1993) . Next, I explore these models using Early and Middle Formative settlement, burial, and architectural data from the Soconusco and Valley of Oaxaca. The results of this examination suggest that the political volatility of Formative Soconuscan society may reflect a higher degree of local competition, whereas the greater political cohesion of Oaxacan society allowed for longer lasting political organization. These organizational tendencies had a profound effect on the evolutionary trajec- (Blake et al. 1995) and Valley of Oaxaca (Blanton et al. 1993) tories evident in each region. In the Soconusco, this resulted in the precocious development of political complexity and in the Valley of Oaxaca it led to a more stable political environment. This essay ends with an evaluation of the historical relationship affecting changes observed in the two regions which may account for the political strategies employed by the elite in each region.
SOME POLITICAL PROCESSES OF RANKED SOCIETIES
The political maneuvering that typifies rank society has received much attention recently under the rubric of factional competition (Brumfiel 1992; Spencer 1993; Brumfiel and Fox 1994) . Brumfiel (1994: 3) defines the process of factional competition as " . . . structurally similar groups. . .[that]. . .compete for advantage within a larger social unit such as a kin group, ethnic group, village or chiefdom . . . [and] . . . this internal competition provides the dynamic for political development." In the following discussion I use the concept of faction loosely as encompassing any group with shared interests that has the ability to act cohesively. A faction can be based on class, ethnicity, or lineage membership as well as on gender, age grades, business cartels, secret societies, and so on. As used here, factions can be based on any of these aspects of an individual's identity; although they tend to be based on social and economic factors that are redirected for political ends. Class, ethnicity, and kinship are likely to be among the most efficient and commonly employed sources of faction building in small-scale societies (see Yoffee 1995:303) . While factions may not always be easily identified archaeologically (especially when factional memberships cross-cut each other), the concept is useful in a heuristic sense to conceptualize political processes of allegiance and opposition that are not based on simple or mutually exclusive groups of people within a given society.
Factional competition occurs at many scales of society, and each scale of interaction is dynamically integrated with those above and below it. In a discussion of chiefdoms, Timothy Earle (1991b) differentiates four scales of analysis: house, community, polity, and region; and incorporates the concept of factional competition into his scales of analysis. He describes the household and community as semi-autonomous units that may exist in competition with each other and in opposition to the overarching polity. Thus the centralization of the chiefdom should always be seen as a fragile, negotiated institution that is held together by an economic interdependence, a justifying ideology, and a concentration of force. (Earle 1991b:13) The relationship of faction building and interfactional negotiation at a given scale and between scales may provide some of the impetus of cultural evolution (see examples in Brumfiel and Fox 1994) . In addition, this perspective deessentializes the concept of political authority by acknowledging its negotiated nature. In rank societies, rather than wield uncontested power, leaders must "shore up" supporting factions and mediate between the leaders own interests, his/her factions' interests, and those of competing factions.
The concept of peer polity interaction (Renfrew and Cherry 1986) provides a useful analog for the mechanisms of factional competition and describes Earle's fourth scale of analysis discussed above. A polity is defined as an autonomous political entity not subject to the jurisdiction of a higher power where " . . . change is seen to emerge from the assemblage of interacting polities" (Renfrew 1986 :6). If we recall Earle's (1991b:13) conceptualization of the household and community as "semiautonomous" units then the logic of peer polity interaction is equally relevant at a local level. The model of peer polity interaction places the locus of cultural change at the regional scale but the concept functions equally well for any scale of intergroup competition. The concepts of peer polity interaction and factional competition both focus attention on the relationship between factionalism internal to a community or polity and relations between them. Peer polity interaction and factional competition are similar insofar as both processes are based on negotiated power relationships between structurally similar groups. The larger the scale of competition, the more complex the interaction will tend to be due to the increased number of political relationships that must be coordinated. Accounting for both inter-and intragroup competition encourages the analyst to explain evolutionary patterns as a process because it is the interaction between the various scales of analysis (i.e., household, community, polity, and region) that is studied. Such a perspective avoids the description of a single scale of organization in isolation and provides a dynamic framework of analysis.
Models of Political Process
If factions are the basic political unit within a given society then how do they compete? A number of archeological theoreticians have focused attention on the strategies employed to mediate between factions within a society (Renfrew 1974; Spencer 1982 Spencer , 1993 Drennan 1991b; Blanton et al. 1996) . In such models, factions are not assumed to always be antagonistic and divisive for a society. Instead, they are the potential fissures along which society may divide. In this section, I review ethnographic examples from Brazil (Spencer 1993) and Burma (Leach 1954; Flannery 1968) to explore the dynamics of factionalism as well as internal and external sources of political authority (sensu Sahlins 1963:292-294). I relate this discussion to recent attempts to characterize Mesoamerican society as oscillating between exclusionary and corporate modes of integration (Blanton et al. 1996) .
Spencer (1993: 43-44) provides two ethnographic examples of societies in Brazil that are integrated in very different ways. Among the Mekranoti-Kayapo, political leaders (called benjadjwyr) cultivate trade relationships with extralocal groups to procure exotic goods that they can then distribute to potential followers in exchange for their allegiance. This strategy is unstable because a number of benjadjwyr compete with each other to build their faction and so a single leader's influence rarely incorporates all members of his village nor does it extend to neighboring villages. As a result, followers can easily shift their allegiance to whichever benjadjwyr provides the best incentives. As Spencer (1993:43) observes, among the Mekranoti-Kayapo, the external dimension of power is somewhat developed but there are not internal reinforcing institutions such as lineal descent or marriage ties. This is because even the most powerful benjadjwyr cannot control access to the extralocal groups and so, in theory, anyone able to trade with external groups can become a benjadjwyr. However, in practice, the network of privileged external relationships are passed from a benjadjwyr to his children (Werner 1981) and so there is an ascribed tendency to this achieved status.
In contrast, the Akwe-Shavante political leaders (called he'a) extend their influence by cultivating relationships with members of nearby villages. This is accomplished largely through age-set ties where age cohorts organize most ceremonial activity (Maybury-Lewis 1974:147). The expanded factional base of a he'a provides allies when he is challenged by an aspiring leader within his own village. Exotic items are not used for status competition and as a result external relationships are not cultivated. However, the Akwe-Shavante system is less stable, as an established he'a is expected to act impartially and settle disputes, whereas an aspiring leader can stir up interfactional rivalry and then assist one side in exchange for future support. As a result, the political dominance of an individual he'a does not last long because aspiring leaders can provide immediate support to his faction members. However, due to their age-set connection he'a are usually able to position their children in political leadership roles (Maybury- Lewis 1974:190 proposed that external relations were used to bolster internal, elite status differentiation in both regions. For example, external relations might include exchange of marriage partners or ritual visits that involved the trade of exotic goods. This extraregional interaction was beneficial to the elite in both areas. The Gulf Coast Olmec elite would receive a supply of precious exotic goods which could be used to "reinforce commitments to the Olmec social and religious systems" (Flannery 1968: 81) . For their part, the Oaxaca elite "emulate the religion, symbolism, dress, and behavior of the Olmec elite insofar as it would enhance their own status among their own people" (Flannery 1968:79 -80 Leach (1954:6) warns that it is "methodologically unsound to treat different varieties of political systems which we now find in the area as independent types; they should clearly be thought of as part of a larger total system."
In political matters the Kachin had two contradictory ideal modes of political organization, the Shan system of government which resembled the feudal hierarchy of their lowland brethren and the gumlao system, which was egalitarian. Leach (1954:9) states:
The gumsa community of Haplang, where Leach conducted his research in 1939 and 1940, was composed of 500 people in nine villages. According to tradition it should have had one aristocratic lineage, whose chief was the headman of one village and the headmen of the other villages would be his tenants with land rights due to historic precedent (Leach 1954:68) . In reality, four of the nine headmen could claim aristocratic status and three of them actually did. In addition, the British colonial government recognized yet another man (with no traditional authority) as the chief. To make matters more complicated, the real power struggle within the community was between two factions; the first was one of the three headmen who traced aristocratic heritage. The other was a nonaristocratic headman who manipulated an aristocratic headman as a puppet leader.
Within this factionalized political environment the gumlao and Shan ideals were pragmatically manipulated to achieve political gain. The oscillation of the gumsa system between Shan and gumlao ideals reflect the shifting balance of internal and external sources of support in Kachin society. The gumsa chief needs kin backing and the support of a community to gain power but external economic support from a Shan prince to maintain it. However, as a chief's status increases his relatives are likely to get jealous and initiate a gumlao revolution. In fact, " . . . the gumlao revolutionary leader is in no sense an aberration from the Kachin norm. As a character he is just the same kind of person as the chief against whom he revolts, an ambitious seeker after power who treats economic facts with greater respect that ritual theories . . ." (Leach 1954:263) . As British colonial rule had decreased lowland Shan power, many Kachin chiefs received less backing and as a result gumlao revolts had increased in frequency. The inherent irony in a Kachin gumsa community is that to be a complete autocrat (and thus reach the Shan end of the political spectrum) would require repudiation of kin ties which are the basis of power. However, to be completely egalitarian (and thus reaching the gumlao end of the political spectrum) all lineages would have be equal. Such an arrangement is equally untenable because the mayu-dama relationship imbedded in the Kachin language, and required for all marriages, involves unequal status relations. Therefore, either end of the political continuum are hypothetical and would be impossible in practice. It is therefore the oscillation between the two ends of the spectrum that provide a framework for political analysis. The Kachin case provides an example of the dynamic balancing act required between internal and external facets of political relations.
In a similar vein, Blanton et al. (1996; also see Feinman 1995; Blanton 1998) have recently defined exclusionary and corporate strategies of political organization. An exclusionary strategy is based on a monopoly of external social and trade relation used to establish prestige locally among a small "exclusive" segment of society. A corporate strategy on the other hand, shares power among different sectors of society which integrates local factions and allows more cohesive polities to emerge. The strength of this model is that it identifies organizational strategies that transcend levels of cultural complexity and thus can address universal political processes. However, as Blanton et al. (1996: 2) acknowledge, the exclusionary/ corporate model is useful insofar as it is understood in the heuristic manner that it was formulated. No political system will actually be completely exclusionary or entirely corporate and there will be a constant dynamic between the two strategies, which are likely linked (Feinman 1995:264 
Previous Research
The Soconusco is part of the fertile Pacific coastal plain that straddles the mod-ern border of Mexico and Guatemala (Fig.  1) (1989, 1991, 1993) have focused on the Middle Formative site of La Blanca and settlement along the Naranjo River. For a chronological overview and phase by phase description of these periods see Blake et al. (1995) .
The Valley of Oaxaca is a broad riverine highland valley in southern Mexico (Fig.  2) (1976) and Peebles (1978) and elaborated on by Steponaitis (1981, 1986) to measure political differences in population size. The model assumes that the size of a community is determined by the number of its inhabitants, which is proportional to the amount of food available. In turn, the quantity of food available is dependent on the productivity of a site's catchment area and the flow of tribute into or out of the community. Therefore, according to this model: community size ϭ land available ϫ the productivity of such land Ϯ tribute.
With single-tiered settlement patterns, community size and catchment productivity are expected to correspond in a positive, linear manner and therefore the greater the food supply, the more people can be supported at a particular site (Steponaitis 1981:324) . This relationship between site size and catchment productivity is expected when there is no intercommunity political coordination and each community simply pursues its own subsistence needs. Steponaitis (1981:325-326) demonstrates that this correlation is true even if tribute flow operates within a community as would be the case in a "bigman" society where a leader could accumulate wealth for competitive feasting. Such ritual exchange generally rotates through several communities and would not be expected to affect the size of any individual settlement involved in such intercommunity activity (Sahlins 1963) . If, however, a constant and unequal flow of resources does occur, then asymmetrical political relations will cause the emergence of a second settlement tier.
In a two-tiered settlement system, village size is a function of catchment productivity and tribute paid, whereas the size of a local center is a function of its catchment productivity and tribute received from dependent villages (Steponaitis 1981:326). Therefore, in the twotiered scenario, the larger size of local centers is attributed to a number of people being provisioned by the influx of tribute from surrounding villages (Steponaitis 1981 (Steponaitis :328, 1984 145-147; cf. Hirth 1984:136 -137 ). The flow of tribute is inferred from the concentration of larger populations found in local centers. Therefore, a two-tiered settlement pattern indicates political power being exercised and its emergence is equated with the development of the most simple chiefdoms. (Clark et al. 1987 (Clark et al. , 1990 (Love 1989 (Love , 1991 . This last source of settlement data was not recorded as site size in hectares and so quantitative comparisons are not possible.
Material and Methods

Data
To apply the model, population (measured as the size of each site) was recorded on the x axis and plotted against its catchment productivity (defined below) recorded on the y axis (Fig. 3) . Expressed mathematically: site size ϭ catchment productivity Ϯ tribute, where catchment productivity ϭ catchment area ϫ the productivity of land.
The crux of this model is that when a site's catchment productivity is controlled for, the relative quantity of tribute flow can be measured as the difference between the regression line of a region's villages and the position of local centers above this line. The relative quantity of tribute received by these centers is thus used as a proxy measure of political power as it reflects control over resources. In a one-tiered system, the y intercept of the regression line produced when villages are plotted is expected to be zero, as a total lack of catchment productivity could support no people (Steponaitis 1984 (Steponaitis :143, 1985 . In a two-tiered settlement system, the y intercept of the lower tier would be zero or lower and a negative number reflects the flow of tribute out of the community. Conversely, the y intercept produced by the regression line of the second tier is expected to be above zero because even when there are no resources, the flow of tribute into these centers could sustain some people. The flow of tribute can be estimated and settlement systems can thus be compared both in terms of their structure (i.e., number of tiers) and the relative quantity of political power exercised (distance of local centers above the village level).
Site size was measured in hectares. Survey components were combined to produce sites in keeping with decisions made by the respective investigators. In the Valley of Oaxaca, as many as nine components were combined to form the dis- persed center of San Jose Mogote (Kowalewski et al. 1989:61) . In the Soconusco, small survey components were combined when they occurred in proximity to large sites and fell within their catchment area or when a number of small components occurred close to each other (see Rosenswig 1998 :59 -62 for component combinations and site sizes). All sites smaller than 1 ha were excluded from the following analysis because such small settlements would not require large catchment areas to sustain their population-such an assumption was also made by Steponaitis (1981:337) , who excluded sites under 2 ha.
FIG. 3-Continued
Catchment area was defined as a 1-km radius around each site based on Chisholm's (1968:131) ethnographic observation that cultivating within such a distance is optimal. The selection of a 1-km catchment radius is further supported by Steponaitis' (1981:335) demonstration that the size of catchment radii does not proportionately affect catchment productivity results, as it is only the relative productivity of land that is modeled (see Steponaitis 1984:144 (Clark 1994:60) . When calculating the quantity of land, a simple correction was used to determine the contribution of each land type based on Clark's (1994:215) estimates of annual crop potential. Class I land can produce three corn crops yearly and is counted as 133% of actual land, class II land can produce two crops and contributes 100%, while only one crop a year is feasibly produced on class III land and thus it contributes 50% of its actual area. These proportions are similar to Kowalewski's (1982: 151) land productivity estimates and the same correction percentages are therefore also used for the Valley of Oaxaca. Within each catchment area the quantity of land types was estimated to the nearest 10th percentile and catchment areas were adjusted, based on land productivity, to produce an adjusted catchment value (Rosenswig 1998:59 -62). For example, if a catchment area contained 1000 ha of land and 10% of it was class I land, 50% class II land, and 40% class III land, then class I land is adjusted to 133 ha, class II land to 500 ha, and class III land to 200 ha. In this example, the catchment area was 1000 ha but due to the land productivity the adjusted catchment value would be 833 ha.
A concern when employing settlement data from surface survey projects is the underrepresentation of deeply buried sites and the fact that surface shards from such sites may not give a representative picture of the extent of these sites. This is undoubtably a problem in both regions. However, for the sake of this comparative analysis earlier period settlement from both regions are assumed to be equally underrepresented. Another assumption of this study is that population density was the same at each site and that all sites were occupied for the same proportion of each ceramic phase. These simplifying assumptions are required to allow the extent of surface shard scatters to represent population (Kowalewski et al. 1989) . Four sites in the survey zone [and possibly three others nearby (Clark 1994:201) ] were larger than 20 ha and had platform mounds up to 3 m high, whereas none of the small sites in the region had platform architecture and all of these villages were only a few hectares in size. If Paso de la Amada was at the head of a three-tiered settlement hierarchy, its power was fleeting and its dominant political position was short lived.
Results
The results of this analysis
A two-tiered settlement pattern describes the following Ocos phase and Aquiles Serdan exceeded Paso de la Amada in terms of size (Fig. 3C ). Fewer sites larger than 1 ha existed than during the Locona phase but the total population was similar, with more people consolidated in the sites that persisted from earlier times (Clark 1994:106) . There were many relatively large second-tier villages during this phase which may reflect the shifting fortunes of various communities and a high degree of intercommunity competition during this 150-year period. A significant difference from Locona times was the rise in fortune of the site of Aquiles Serdan, which surpassed Paso de la Amada in size despite its lower catchment productivity. During the Cherla phase ( Fig. 3D ) there were again fewer sites but a more clearly defined, twotiered settlement hierarchy returned at a lower order of magnitude than the Ocos period. Ocos phase obsidian from three different sources were differentially distributed between these local centers and homogeneously distributed within each center and neighboring villages . Such obsidian distribution indicates that a number of self-contained networks were focused around local centers and provides an additional, and independent, measure of political activity in the region. La Blanca-Ocos zone of the Soconusco. As stated from the outset, the La Blanca-Ocos settlement data cannot be compared quantitatively but are illuminating for a qualitative comparison with the Valley of Oaxaca. The La Blanca-Ocos zone of the Soconusco was less densely populated than Mazatan with only three sites larger than 1 ha in the Ocos phase (La Victoria, La Blanca, and Sage) and only two such sites in the Cuadros/Jocotal phase (Sage and Salinas La Blanca) but none larger than 3 ha (Fig. 1 ). There were no centers in the Early Formative and a single-tiered settlement organization existed in this zone despite the fact that it shared the same ceramic sequence as the Mazatan zone 25 km up the coast (Love 1989 (Love , 1991 .
This one-tiered settlement system changed quite dramatically during the Middle Formative when three tiers of settlement are documented (Love 1991:38 (Kowalewski et al. 1989:66) . However, the site of Tierras Largas is the only site (other than San Jose Mogote) during these three phases larger than 3 ha. Tierras Largas reached 6.3 ha, which is almost the same size as San Jose Mogote during the Tierras Largas phase (6.8 ha). The Tierras Largas site was situated at an agriculturally marginal location with no class I land within its 1-km catchment radius and its unexpectedly large size (given its poor catchment productivity) may be due to its strategic location on the Atoyac River between the Etla arm and the rest of the valley (Fig. 2) . During the San Jose phase, when San Jose Mogote was experiencing its population explosion, Tierras Largas increased to four times its previous size.
Tribute Flow in the Soconusco and Valley of Oaxaca
The structure of settlement (i.e., number of tiers) has been discussed in the Table 2 ). The distance above this line was calculated for each center. The average tribute level of all centers was calculated for each phase (Table 2-first two columns) and it is these numbers that are plotted in Fig. 4 . As there was a single second-tier site for the Barra phase in the Soconusco and all three Oaxacan phases, the largest sites and the average of all sites is the same. Thus, for comparative purposes the largest site's size, from each Soconusco phase, is also included in Table 2 In the Soconusco, there appears to be a fluctuating pattern to the quantity of tribute flow in the survey zone. A considerable increase is evident from the Barra to Locona phases which then decreases from the Ocos to Cherla periods. The flow of tribute within the survey zone reached a minimal level during the Cuadros phase (Fig. 4) despite an overall increase in the number of sites (Fig. 3E) . In the Jocotal period, tribute flow increased rapidly and it is during this phase that the y intercept of villages was its lowest (Table 2) , suggesting that the greatest amount of tribute was being extracted from villages. It is significant that the center of political power moved outside the survey zone during Cuadros. If the territorial unit of analysis encompassed the entire political unit, Cuadros phase tribute levels would likely be at least as high as earlier phases and Jocotal phase tribute would be higher still. However, these late Early Formative patterns remain to be documented through future survey.
Obsidian patterns again elucidate polit- 
Summary of Settlement Data
Based on the settlement data presented, the Barra phase from the Soconusco and the Tierras Largas phase from the Valley of Oaxaca resemble each other as a single center is slightly larger than surrounding villages. Political complexity, as measured by the flow of tribute, is ambiguous during these initial ceramic phases. During the following Early Formative phases, the settlement trajectories of these two regions diverged quite dramatically, yet both clearly indicate the establishment of unequal political relations. In the Valley of Oaxaca, the unchallenged position of San Jose Mogote persisted through the Guadalupe times (Figs. 3H and 3I ). In the Soconusco, a significant reorganization occurred during the Locona phase, and a hierarchical settlement system developed ( 
Mortuary Patterns
Theory and Expectations
Cross-cultural studies indicate that there is a correlation between an individual's status in life and their treatment in death (Saxe 1970; Binford 1971 ; also see Brown 1995) . Based on role theory (Goodenough 1965), an individual is said to possess many social personae such as father, teacher, and chief. Leaders are expected to possess a larger number of social personae than an average member of the same society due to the greater number of social roles they possess and functions they serve in community matters (Tainter 1978 
Material and Method
The following analysis employs a data set of 196 Early and Middle Formative interments from the Soconusco (n ϭ 58) and the Valley of Oaxaca (n ϭ 138) regions (Appendices 1 and 2) . A diversity analysis is employed to approximate the number of social personae that are evident from each mortuary event. This type of analysis has been productively employed by mortuary analysts to quantify information expressed by those who bury the dead (see Cannon 1989; Sempowski 1992; Howell and Kintigh 1996) . In order to calculate the diversity scores used in the following analysis the presence or absence of each artifact type recovered (e.g., jade bead, ceramic vessel, shell pendant, etc.) was tabulated regardless of its quantity. So, for example, if five or six jade beads were recovered around the neck of an individual a score of "1" was recorded. However, an artifact type was counted more than once when it was recovered from multiple locations around a body. The four locations were as follows: at the head, the body, the legs, and in the mouth. As a result, any artifact type could contribute a maximum of four points toward the diversity score. This approach results in the remains of a necklace or a pair of earrings counting only one time regardless of the number of pieces the archaeologist finds them in.
As well as grave goods, the presence of a tomb or stones covering a burial, evidence of pigment employed at the mortuary event, or secondary burials placed in association with a primary interment each contributed a point to the diversity score. In addition, the presence of cranial deformation contributed a point to diversity scores, not because this was part of the interment ritual but because it is the expression of a social message in life and it is ultimately the number social personae that I am trying to estimate. Cranial deformation would have been performed early in life and contributed to a public form of discourse throughout the individual's life.
There are a number of potential problems with this approach: (1) not all messages are expressed in a manner that is preserved archaeologically (e.g., singing or dancing) and this could underrepresent the quantity of documented messages, (2) a single social personae can be expressed by many symbols and this could potentially inflate the apparent number of social roles being symbolized, and (3) nonpersonae signifying grave inclusions (i.e., related to the manner of death or idiosyncratic preferences of an individual) may further inflate status symbolizing diversity. An additional problem relates to the size and representativeness of the burial populations. Some of the burial populations analyzed are small and consist of as few as eight individuals. In addition, the regional nature of this database and the fact that burials are grouped relative to ceramic phases, which last up to 300 years, results in burial populations with no necessary temporal or spatial association. As a result, the data are presented using simple descriptive statistics and the preliminary nature of the results is emphasized.
This quantitative assessment does not incorporate a range of possible qualitative indicators of rank or "badges of authority" (Braun 1979 
Quantitative Results
Seven graphs (Fig. 5) summarize the diversity profiles of burial data. These graphs show three patterns: no burial offerings, a continuous yet limited number of different diversity scores, and, finally, a discontinuous pattern of burial diversity. All periods in both regions have at least 75% of burials with a diversity score of 0 or 1. In the majority of time periods there are a number of burials forming a continuous distribution up to a diversity score of 5.
In the Soconusco, the Locona, Ocos, and Cherla burials exhibited a continuous distribution of diversity scores. The only two burials from the Soconusco with a diversity score above 0 after the Cherla phase were Middle Formative burials from El Pajon (Pailles 1980:92-106) and Huanacastal (Clark et al. 1987:23-24 ). Neither of these two interments had any grave inclusions and both receive diversity scores of 1 due to frontal occipital cranial flattening. This means that in the Soconusco, none of the burials discussed in this article from between 1000 and 650 B.C.E. contain grave goods. Although perhaps the result of small samples, it is also possible that during these periods burials were being treated in a different manner than in earlier times. If the number of Middle Formative burials is not proportionately underrepresented, then this pattern may signify a shift to mortuary ritual that does not leave archaeological remains as Feinman and Neitzel suggest in the quote above. Such a change in mortuary ritual would correspond with the demographic and political changes evident in the Cuadros phase and it would follow that changes in mortuary ritual may have accompanied the political transition occurring at this time. However, due to the sample size this interpretation must remain conjectural until more work is done.
In the Valley of Oaxaca, the Tierras Largas burial record exhibited a limited amount of diversity which appear to increase during the San Jose phase. From the Middle Formative Guadalupe phase burial record, there is a hint that two distinct levels of social status, encoded in mortuary ritual, may have emerged. The mortuary pattern from the Guadalupe phase is the only example (from the cases examined here) that suggests ranking of burial diversity. Overall, burial diversity in the Valley of Oaxaca gradually, yet progressively, increased. However, sample size may be responsible for low Tierras Largas period diversity.
Discussion and Qualitative Assessment
The following discussion describes some of the burials from each phase that produced the highest diversity scores. In the Soconusco, a child with a mirror head-dress, a piece of greenstone behind its head, and covered in red pigment (Clark 1991) and an adult male with two ceramic vessels with stone pebbles in one and a mortar and stone cobbles around the body (Clark 1994:402) produced diversity scores
FIG. 5. Relative percentage of diversity scores for Early and Middle Formative burials in the Soconusco (A-D) and the Valley of Oaxaca (E-G).
of 3 and 4 respectively. Both interments date to the Locona phase and were recovered at the Chilo site. A female burial from the Cherla phase at Paso de la Amada was found with a mirror on each side of her head, a stone bowl and cobble at her chest, and a greenstone bead at her face-producing a diversity score of 4. As already noted, later period burials are not amenable to this form of analysis and such a change may signify evolving social practices, possibly curation above ground, which would have been more public and therefore potentially a more competitive form of display (e.g., Goldman 1970) .
In the Valley of Oaxaca, a Tierras Largas phase, female burial (no. 19) was encountered at the Tierras Largas site with a diversity score of 2, as she was interred with a mano and a metate (Winter 1972 :325) and a male (no. 29) was buried at San Jose Mogote in a seated position with a ceramic vessel and thus produced a diversity score of 1. Of the San Jose phase burials with the highest diversity scores, five interments were found at Tomaltepec and four more at San Jose Mogote. Of these nine high-diversity burials four were female, three were male, and one was a child. One of the San Jose phase burials (no. 11) was a male from Tomaltepec with a diversity score of 5 and was found in a seated position with two ceramic vessels and a greenstone celt at his feet, another vessel at his head, with 15 greenstone beads near his neck and 1 in his mouth (Whalen 1981:147) . From the Guadalupe phase, the two highest diversity burials were both women. At Tomaltepec, burial no. 68 had a ceramic vessel at her head, a chert point at her chest, and a greenstone bead in her mouth and one at her chest (Whalen 1981:152 ). The only burial with a higher diversity score was an old woman from Fabrica San Jose (no. 39) with a score of 8; she was interred with a vessel at her feet, two at her chest, and one at her head; 47 round and six tabular greenstone beads in her mouth; a brown stone bead and greenstone pendant were recovered from her mouth; and there was evidence of red pigment covering part of her body (Drennan 1976:248).
The highest diversity scores are attributed to the same individuals that possessed proposed high-status indicators (e.g., interment in a seated position, with red pigment, or mirrors) or those with the greatest number of grave goods (e.g., Burial no. 39 at Fabrica San Jose interred with 59 individual objects or Burial no. 11 at Tomaltepec with 20 objects). This correspondence between high diversity counts and other possible gauges of social status suggests that the preceding analysis at least roughly reflects social differences due to the convergence of various indicators of inequality. An advantage of employing diversity scores in this case is that they are easily presented for visual comparison between phases and across regions.
Summary of Mortuary Data
All of the Early Formative mortuary patterns in both regions suggest that burials were not used to blatantly express social differentiation. Some differences are evident but the only hint of clear differentiation was the relatively lavish Guadalupe phase Burial no. 39 from Fabrica San Jose. The results of this mortuary analysis suggest a corporate (Blanton et al. 1996) The type of regional, quantitative comparisons presented in this article for settlement and burial evidence are difficult to obtain for architectural data due to the number of detailed excavations that would be required from all of the structures in many communities and from each time period in a given region. This type of data is not yet extensive enough in either region to undertake such a comparison. However, in this section architectural evidence is discussed as systematically as the data permits. Residences are compared in terms of their size and form, which reflect both the expenditure of labor required in construction and the degree to which certain segments of the population were differentiated from others. Public architecture is also presented and compared between the two regions so that a complete assessment of architectural evolution can be presented and residential architecture can be discussed relative to nonresidential buildings. All relevant architectural data discussed in this section are presented elsewhere (Rosenswig 1998: 68 -69) and summarized here in terms of the approximate amount of labor required to build them (Table 3) Households at San Jose Mogote during the San Jose phase have been interpreted as forming a continuum in social status from elite to nonelite (Marcus and Flannery 1996:103). For example, House 13 in Area A was a simple dwelling 5 ϫ 3 m in size. House 2 in Area C was the same size but whitewashed and contained a higher frequency of deer bone and exotic artifacts. House 16-17 in Area B was also whitewashed and had one room attached to a lean-to shed containing artifacts similar to House 2 but with higher quantities of jade. Better quality houses are thus defined by being whitewashed and by the artifacts found in them. Therefore, houses would not have been significantly differentiated in their size or form and the unequal levels of wealth (measured by exotic and high labor investment artifacts) contained within these residences did not correspond to overt architectural symbols of social ranking. This is consistent with a group-oriented chiefdom (Renfrew 1974 ) that depended on a corporate strategy of integration (Blanton et al. 1996) and could have cultivated internal sources of political authority (Spencer 1993) .
Architectural Patterns
Theory and Method
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Summary of Architectural Data
In the Soconusco, changing size of elite residential architecture within communities corresponds closely with political differences within the region (inferred from the settlement data). Beginning in the Locona phase, large elite residences were built, augmented, and abandoned depending on the political fortunes of their inhabitants. Therefore, residential platform construction may both symbolically and physically reflect the fortunes of powerful factions within the polity. This residential differentiation is consistent with an exclusionary strategy (Blanton et al. 1996) or an individualizing chiefdom (Renfrew 1974) as long as the "individual" is taken to be a faction rather than only the figurehead, or chief, that represents a supporting faction.
Based on the evidence currently available, Middle Formative construction activity in the Soconusco was less focused on elite residences and relatively more energy was expended in the construction of public architecture, which attained a monumental level. However, both elite residences and nonresidential architecture required a large labor output. If we assume that the Middle Formative elite sponsored the construction of nonresidential mounds, then both residential and nonresidential architecture attest to the power of the elite at regional centers. This is consistent with an exclusionary strategy that emphasized external relations and could also be called an Individualizing Chiefdom (again, as discussed for the Early Formative, if individual factions are being emphasized). Following such an interpretation, specific elite factions (i.e., households/lineages) would have been emphasized and differentiated through the conspicuous consumption of labor expended in a manner that persists over time on the social landscape. However, these symbols would have only persisted as long as a given village was occupied. Shifting political centers would have necessitated new architectural projects that redesigned the social and political landscape every century or so and would have consumed large quantities of labor.
In the Valley of Oaxaca, residential differences were not emphasized and households were similar in size (Table 3) Public architecture reinforced these strategies in the Oaxacan Middle Formative, for while more energy was expended on public architecture it was a mere fraction of that expended in the Soconusco (Table 3) . Structures 1 and 2 at San Jose Mogote are interpreted as being organized in a unifying manner, as two zoomorphic sculptures on Structure 2 may represent the were-jaguar and fire-serpent lineages who inhabited the site (Marcus 1989). If different social groups were represented at this public building it could have helped to symbolically unify potentially adversarial factions within the community. In addition, residences are interpreted as being elite based solely on associated artifacts, burials, and proximity to public architecture and have little to distinguish them from nonelite residences in appearance. Thus, while economic differences exist, the outward expression of social differentiation was minimal. Modest signs of social differentiation in both burials and architecture would have helped to create internal cohesion and bolstered internal sources of political authority (Spencer 1993) . Table 3 (Fig. 3) . Therefore, the real issue is not if but how the Soconusco elite symbolically expressed their political power. However, this disagreement need not detract from the point I am attempting to make. If the reader substitutes the functionally neutral term "large platform" for "elite residence" I believe the interpretations are no less plausible.
A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE SOCONUSCO AND VALLEY OF OAXACA
Studying political process by examining differing aspects of leadership strategy and social integration has been proposed by Leach (1954) , Sahlins (1963) , and Renfrew (1974) . The approach was first employed in Mesoamerican archaeology by Flannery (1968) and more recently Spencer (1982, 1993) and Blanton et al. (1996) have expanded its application. This article employs such theoretical models to compare Early and Middle Formative societies from the Soconusco and Valley of Oaxaca. This is done by comparing three classes of data from each region using the same summary techniques to produce comparable results. Table 4 provides a chronologically ordered summary of the data presented in this article.
In all but the Barra and Tierras Largas phases, the Formative societies of Oaxaca and the Soconusco were politically ranked based on settlement data. Therefore, the differences discussed in this article are not due to their "level of complexity" but instead appear to be the result of political systems that employed different integrative strategies. As I have argued, a Oaxacan polity was centered at San Jose Mogote and the elite in this community appear to have employed a predomi-nantly corporate strategy of integration that depended on internal sources of authority when compared to the elite in various Soconuscan polities. The latter exhibited a greater degree of political factionalism within each of the closely packed polities and greater competition between the elites in neighboring centers. This competition appears to be responsible for a relatively more exclusionary strategy with political authority embedded in the relations between polities.
In the Soconusco, settlement hierarchy clearly emerged by Locona times (Fig. 3B ) and the population was clustered around as many as seven centers. The most powerful of these centers shifted often as political fortunes waxed and waned and as the quantity of tribute that flowed within the region fluctuated (Fig. 4) . Large residences were built on raised platforms at political centers from Locona times onward and required hundreds of person/ days to construct (Table 3) . Such structures may have functioned as the symbolic focus of political authority within the community, as they accentuated status differences between those that lived in large residences and those that did not. Elite residences and burials with higher diversity scores and "badges of authority" have to date only been found at centers that received tribute according to the result in Fig. 3 
DISCUSSION
The discussion above does not account for the historical relationship between the two regions. In fact, the scenario related above implicitly assumes that each cultural sequence unfolded independently of the other. A discussion of who influenced whom or to what degree this occurred (i.e., see Sharer and Grove 1989) is beyond the scope of this article. However, if the reader will grant the rather uncontroversial assertion that most sedentary Early Formative Mesoamerican societies were aware of each other, then a problem with the ahistorical scenario presented in the last section is that it fails to account for the sequence of emergent inequality in the two regions. The Barra and Tierras Largas phases were not contemporaneous and neither were the Locona and San Jose periods, when inequality is first evident (see Table 4 ). In fact, the Locona phase began 250 years (and ended 100 years) before the commencement of the San Jose phase. Clark and Blake (1994) A comparison of Oaxacan and Soconuscan Early and Middle Formative trajectories highlights the fact that a polity's organizational strategy may provide more insight into explaining cultural processes than an evolutionary typology that measures the degree of cultural complexity. The interpretive advantage of examining culture in terms of the models discussed in this article (i.e., Leach 1954; Sahlins 1963; Renfrew 1974; Spencer 1993; Blanton et al. 1996) is that these are evolutionary structuring principles that can be used to compare societies at the "same stage" or between "different stages" of an evolution typology. As Drennan (1991b:284) notes, " . . . there are a number of important ways that chiefdoms differ from each other, aside from being more or less developed." Or as Nelson (1995:599) puts it, " . . . an appropriate question to ask about the two polities at hand is not only "How complex were they?" but also "How were they complex?" All of the societies examined in this study would be classified as intermediate by Feinman and Neitzel (1984) , and except for those of the Barra and Tierras Largas time periods, they would be called chiefdoms by others (e.g., Service 1975) . It is now a quarter-century since Peebles and Kus (1977; also see Renfrew 1973) began identifying ranked societies in the archaeological record. As the title of this essay alludes to, it is now more elucidating to explore the integrative processes of such societies than to define them according to evolutionary typologies. 
